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In the Supren1e Court of the
State of Utah
KNUDSEN MUSIC COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

CASE
NO. 7696

JACK MASTERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All bold fiace, unless otherwise noted, are respondent's)

The respondent believes that the appellant's statement
of the facts is misleading because it fails to include certain
essential facts and mis-states others so as to leave inferences that are not directly warranted; consequently, with
the following revisions to the appellant's facts, a more true
and accurate statement will be had.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract on February 27, 1950, under which the defendant refinanced three
machines he had in his possession, two Model 1015's and
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one Gismo model and under which he traded in two older
model 1100's on two new Model 1080's (Tr. 6, 7, 9, 10, 92).
The appellant states on page three of his brief that
the new contract of February 27, 1950, was made because
the two 1100 machines were defective. This mis-states
the faots in that it fails to show that the primary purpose
for the new contract was because the defendant found it
necessary to refinance his machines, and because he had
been notified that the machines would be repossessed unless he took steps to rectify his delinquent payments (Tr.
page 6).
Counsel infer~, by stating on page three of his brief,
that the No. 1080 machines "were represented as new machines"; that they were not new machines. It is uncontradicted that these machines, the 1080's, were new and
that they were packed in their original cases and had not
been opened when delivered to the vendee (Tr. 10, 42, 44,
51).
Attached to each machine was a warranty by the manufacturer warranting the workmanship and the working
parts of the machine and which warranty the defendant
read and knew about (Tr. 78, 79).
The defendant, at the time of picking up the new machines at the plaintiff's Provo office, had every right and
oportunity to open and inspect the machines (Tr. 78).
The defendant testified that he read the contract and
was familiar with the terms thereof and that he knew of
Paragraph F1our, which is set out as follows:
"No warranties, representations or agreements
have been made by Seller unless specifically set forth
herein, and this contract may not be enlarged, modified, or altered except by endorsement hereon by the
parties hereto."
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He testified that there was no representation made by
the plaintiff as to the condition of the machines (Tr. 81) .
The defendant, on page two of his brief, sets out provisions which he says relate to the rights after repossession. In addition to the portion of paragraph six that he
sets out on page two, paragraph eight of the contract (Ex.
A) is also applicable.
Counsel for the defendant states on page three that
the mechanical portions of the phonograph were covered
with rust and corrosion. This is disputable and is not 'Conclusive, as shown by the testimony of the plaintiff (Tr. 108,
109).
The defendant had these machine for five weeks or
longer and during this time he did not complain of their
service and did not notify the seller of any defects in the
machines (Tr. 54, 80), nor make any attempts to enforce
the warranty (Tr. 78, 79) on the machines made by the
manufacturer (Tr. 554, 80).
The appellant states on page four of his brief that he
removed the machines because they did not operate; however, he does not include in his brief the fact that the vendor, Mr. Knudsen, called him in the first part of April, five
weeks after the machines had been on location, and told
him that unless he made a payment the machines would
be repossessed, and at that time Mr. Masterson first informed Mr. Knudsen that the machines were not operating ·
to his satisfaction (Tr. 75). Mr. Knudsen testified that
the vendee at this time, did not tell him that there was. anything materially wrong with the machines other than they
needed oiling when he received them (Tr. 54). Subsequent
to this conversation the machines were removed from location.
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Counsel states on page four of his brief that the defendant wrote the plaintiff that he was going to lose his
best locations. There is no evidence that the defendant
wrote to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff ever received
any word from the defendant by letter as stated on page
four (Tr. 98, 99).
The defendant testified that the machines were in good
enough shape to place them on location in the first place
and that they were apparently serviceable and that "he
could get by with them" (Tr. 91, 92).
After the machines had been on location four or five
weeks, the plaintiff notified the defendant that no payments had been made on the contract, and that unless he
did make up the delinquent payments it would be necessary to repossess the machines (Tr. 10, 11, 75, 88). Not
until that date did the defendant notify the plaintiff of any
defecti in the machines themselves (Tr. 92).
No payment having been received, the plaintiff, in the
latter part of April, found it necessary to send a man to
Panguitch to repossess the machines from the defendant
(Tr. 59). The plaintiff's president, Mr. Wesley Knudsen,
testified that when the machines came back he personally
made a careful inspection of them and that it was necessary to service these machines so as to make them saleable,
but that the machines were serviceable and that they were
placed in good working :condition. by mere adjustments,
and that he could find no evidence of "rust or corrosion"
and that there was nothing wrong with the cmahines other
than normal wear and tear (Tr. 49, 54, 108, 109, 110).
The plaintiff testified that his company's fiscal year
ended June 30 and that it was necessary to set these machines up on the books ·of the company, for they were as-
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sets of the company and were in its possession; consequently, they had to be inventoried at a true value.
The plaintiff introduced evidence as to the method of
establishing the value of property repossessed, and the
facts show that the value was not arbitrarily reached as
stated in appellant' brief, page five, but was based upon
taking the average of the high and low monthly selling
price of these machines for the period as determined by
statistics suppled in the price list of "Cash Box," a periodical published for the music industry, and ~hat these
prices fairly and accurately indicated the true value of the
machines and that this was the common and usual practice of valuation in the industry (Tr. 30, 31).
The plaintiff, Wesley Knudsen, testified that after repossession, the machines were put on his sales floor and
that they were not differentiated from any other machine.
He stated, contrary to the appellant's brief, page six, that
all the machines were sold and that he had records of sale
except for one machine, a Model 1015 which, through an
error in bookkeeping, the serial number had not been taken but that he knew it had not been sold for more than
$275.00 for that was the highest amount for any time that
year that a Model 1015 had been sold for (Tr. 12, 19, 21,
23, 25).
The respondent also refutes the facts as the defendant states them as to evidence of resale on page six of his
brief. The plaintiff offered in evidence invoices of sale on
every machine but the 1015 mentioned ~supra and with the
names of those who purchased and their addresses and
the amount on the four different machines, and that they
were sold for a total of $815.00 (Tr. 12, 19, 21, 23, 25). He
testified that the other 1015 machine, without serial num-
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ber, could not have been sold for more than $275.00 and allowing a $275.00 amount as a credit in addition to the
$815.00, it totals $1090.00, which is merely a matter of calculation as the court indicated (Tr. 25). However, he gave
the defendant a credit on his books of $1185.00 as per the
"·Cash Box" value, (Tr. 17, 26) whi-ch was the reasonable
value of the machines at the date of repossession (Tr. 27).
The appellant's brief, page six, states that the evidence
of resale is stricken from the record upon the plaintiff's
motion (Tr. 39); however, this is not true and all evidence
of resale was stricken from the record upon the defendant's motion (Tr. 39).
The defendant, in his answer and counterclaim to the
plaintiff's complaint, alleges merely a rescission of the contract or denies that the contract was performed. The defendant did not appeal to the equity of the court and did
not, in any way, allege any breach of warranty.
The court found that there was no evidence of rescission and that the plaintiff did perform his contract (Tr.
116, 117) ; that the defendant, in the case below did find
some minor defects in the machines but that there was no
representation by the plaintiff as to the condition of the
machines (Tr. 117).
The court also found that the vendee was experienced
in this type of business and that it was not until the second payment was past due that the defendant repudiated
the contract (Tr. 117).
The court found that the contract had been completely
negotiated (Tr. 115) and that the defendant signed the
same with full knowledge of its terms and provisions (Tr.
116).
The court found that the plaintiff, shortly after the
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repossession of the machines, made a careful examination of
the local market value of the machines and gave the defendant, Jack Masterson, a credit of $1185, the then reasonable value of the machines (Tr. 118).
From this judgment the defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

The trial court did not err in entering a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, said judgment being in accordance
with the law and evidence.
POINT II

The trial court did not err in making and entering the
finding of fact Number Four to the effect that the plaintiff had done and performed all the steps and conditions
of the contract to be performed by it at the time and the
manner therein specified.
POINT ill

The trial court did not err in making finding of fact
Number Nine, that the sum of $1185.00 was the reasonable value of the machines at the time of the repossession,
said finding being in accordance with the evidence.
POINT IV

The trial court did not err in making and entering finding of fact Number Ten, that any defect that there may
have been in the machines is immaterial, said finding being in accordance with the evidence and defendant not alleging any claim for breach of warranty.
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POINT V
The trial court did not err in making and entering the
conclusion of law Number One, to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant in the
amount of $1,860.96, there being sufficient evidence to support the conclusion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL- COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF, SAID
J'UDGMENT BEING IN ACCO·RD·ANCE WITH THE LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE.
It is true that the trial court found that the plaintiff
had been damaged by the defendant's breach of contract
and was entitled to the difference between the contract
price and the value of the machines at the time the defend~
ant was given a credit on the books of the plaintiff's company. The respondent contends like the appellant that the
rights of the parties after repossession are to be determined
by the terms of the contract; however, the appellant fails
to- consider the entire terms of the contract in his argument on the first point.
The defendant assumes that all evidence of resale was
stricken upon the plaintiff's motion. He is in error in this
assumption. The transcript (p. 39) dfeinitely shows that
all evidence of resale was stricken on defendant's motion
in the trial court and upon his objection that such evidence
of resale was too remote from the date of repossession.
_ The law is not confused as to a party's position on an
objection such as this on appeal. There have been similar
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cases where a party has tried to take advantage of an error of his own making. In Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Ore.
621, 87 Pac. 2d 209, the court said:
"A party is not in a position to claim error in respect to the exclusion of evidence ·to the admission of
which he has objected.''

In another similar case, Zindell v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 22 Wis. 575, 269 N. W. 327, the court said:
''Defendant in an action for damages to a building
by tort cannot take ·advantage of the failure of the
trial court to limit the damages recoverable to the
amount of the diminished value as the result of the
tqrt- if ·such ·amount is less· than the cost of- the repair,
where upon his objection the -court excluded the plaintiff's offer to prove the diminished value by proving
the -value of the building as it was before and after collission.''
There is ample authority on this question; however,
American Jurisprudence has put is in the following language:
"On the same principle, a party cannot complain
of the exclusion of evidence and consequent de~ect in
the proof if it was excluded up~n his request. Similarly one who has brought about the erroneous exclu- ·
sion of documentary .evidence is not in a position to
complain of the introduction of secondary evidence."
3 American Jurisprudence 432, sec. 880.
American Jurisprudence. cited Pulsifer v. Walker, 85
N. H. 434, 149 A. 426 as authority for the above textual
material.
It is the respondent's contention that this is perhaps
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not the true solution to the matter, but it does rebut the
appellant's contention on point one.
The appellant sets out what he considers to be the
rights and remedies of the parties after repossession; however, he fails to include Paragraph 8 of the contract which
is quoted below and which also sets out the rights of the
parties after repossession:
"Seller shall have the right to enforce one or more
remedies hereunder, successively or concurrently and
such action shall not stop or prevent the seller from
pursuing any other remedy hereunder, and any repossession, retaking, or sale of the property pursuant
to the terms hereof shall not release the purchaser
until the purchase price has been paid in full in cash,
nor shall the institution of suit for the purchase price
prevent seller from later retaking possession of said
property by action or otherwise. Purchaser hereby
waives the right to remove any legal action from the
court originally acquiring jurisdiction."
Appellant's entire contention overlooks the fact that
in Paragraph 6, Ex. A., which says that in the event of
such repossession, the seller ''may'' resell. You would asspme from the appellant's argument that "may" is mandatory, but this is not true. "May" is a discretionary word.
It alows an option to the seller to either resell or not to
resell. Words and Phrases sets out the following definitions of the word "may":
"'May' does not mean 'shall' and is not so construed in private contracts. It is only in the case of
statutes by which public rights are involved that this
construction is sometimes adopted ex debito justitiae."
Northwestern Traveling Men's Association v. Crawford, 126 Ill. App. 468, 480.
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"The word 'may' is usually only permissive or discretionary." State v. Stepp, 59 S. E. 1068, 63 W. Va.
254.

The defendant also ignores the fact that if the seller
sells, he may sell at a private sale and without notice to the
purchaser, and the seller may bid at such sale. Giving the
words their full and natural import, it is evident that the
seller may repossess the property in behalf of the purchaser
and sell it to himself at a private sale, crediting the amount
to the account of the purchaser. The result would not be
different than that of the principal case. The plaintiff repossessed the property from the defendant, took it into his
workshop, repaired and serviced it, put it on his sales. floor,
and gave the defendant a credit for it at its actual market
value. This, in fact, constitutes a sale to himself, which he
could do under the terms of the contract, and it is clearly
within the rights of the seller after repossession. From
that time on, the plaintiff has the right to damages between
the amount credited to defendant and the original contract
price.
The language of the contract is intentionally broad
enough to cover this situation. Such a transaction is usual
in this type of business and constitutes a private sale without notice, and at which sale the seller was the purchaser.
All the law requires is that the sale be fair, and the record
clearly indicated that in this case the amount credited to
the defendant was the actual value of the machines and
more than they eventually sold for. In Pussley v. McLanahan Bros., 14 Ga. App. 366, 80 S. E. 902, the court said:
"It has been held in a case involving a contract
provision for resale, that a sale by the vendor to himself. even though the sale is free from fraud, is void-·
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able at the option of the vendee, providing the vendee
tenders the payment of the debt secured by the property.''
It will be noted in this case that the vendee has never
tendered payment of the purchase price so, consequently,
has never avoided such sale.
By Paragraph 8, quoted supra, the seller may enforce
any of his remedies successively or concurrently. That
paragraph mentions particularly that any repossession, retaking or sale shall not .release the purchaser until the purchase price has been paid in full.
The defendant, in his brief, ·page 14, misquotes the
facts. The plaintiff's president, Mr. ·Knudsen, testified that
he did ·know what happened to the machines, and that he
knew that they had ·been sold, and the price received for
each sale. However, the evidence of resale ·was excluded
upon motion of the defendant. Plaintiff testified and introduced evidence showing that his valuation of the machines and his credit to the defendant on the books of the
company was not an arbitrary figure, but was arrived at
sale price of each
by taking averages of the high and 1ow.
.
machine during the period immediately ~rior to the. entry
made on the."'books. of the corppany. His ~alculations and
figures were based upon nation-wide. statistics as furnished
in "Cash Box," a periodical circulate(l in ~he music ~ndus
try. It is apparent that the court. considered th~s to be a
private sale to the plaintiff, and allowed it as a fair sale.
Regardless of this, the defendant .cannot take advantage
by claiming no evidence of resale when such evidence was
excluded upon his own motion~
.

.

.

"•
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING
AND ENTERING THE FINDING OF F ACf NUMBER
FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD
DONE AND PERFORMED ALL THE STEPS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT TO BE PERFORMED
BY IT AT THE TIME AND MANNER THEREIN SPE- .
CIFIED.
The plaintiff had sold three machines to the defendant on a prior contract. These machines had become used
and dated and also the defendant was behind in his payments. The plaintiff required the defendant to bring his
payments up to date or he would have to repossess the me~hines. In order to prevent this from hapening, the defendant made arrangements with the plaintiff to refinance
the contract with the Lockhart Company, and at this time,
trade in his two old Model 1100's on two new Model 1080's
(Tr. 6, 7, 9, 10, 92). This contract was dated February 27,
1950. There is no evidence that the Model 1100's were
traded for any other reason other than that they were used
machines and not working as satisfactorily as new machines would. The defendant's argument is such as to infer that this new contract was made because of some defect in the 1100 machines. The evidence clearly rebuts
this inference.
There is abselutely no doubt that the Model 1080's
sold to the defendant were new machines (Tr. 10, 42, 44,
51). The evidence that they were rusted or corroded was
not convincing and did not impress the trial court, nor was
it sufficient to overcome the testimony of the plaintiff that ·
the machines were in good working condition, and that .
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there was no evidence of rust or corrosion having been on
them at any time.
We assume that the citations quoted by the defendant
are correct; however, they are misapplied. There is absolutely no evidence that the plaintiff failed to perform any
condition of the contract. He made no warranties (Ex. A
Paragraph 4) and the appellant stated that he read the
contract and that he was familiar with its terms, that he
had been in the business for a number of years, and that
he had purchased under this type of contract many
times before. The seller did everything it was required
to do under the contract. It delivered to the defendant the
new machines. Any statement by the appellant that these
Model 1080 machines were not new is contrary to the evidence. The defendant testified that there was a manufacturer's warranty on the machines, that he read the warranty, and that it protected him from any defects, workmanship or parts and that there was no warranty made
by the plaintiff in any respect. It is submitted that this
finding is in accordance with the evidence.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID N·OT ERR IN MAKING
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER NINE, THAT THE SUM

OF $1,185.00 WAS THE RE.A:S.O·NABLE VAIJUE OF THE
MACHINES cAT THE TIMEJ OF THE REPOSSESSION,
SAID FINDING BEING IN A~CCORDANCE WITH: THE
EVIDENCE.

Wesley Knudsen, President of the plaintiff corporation, testified as to the method of determining the value of
the machines at the time the credit was given to the de-
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fendant (Tr. 30, 31). This sum was not an arbitrary figure, but was based upon statistics found in "Cash Box", a
monthly periodical circulated in the mu·sic industry. These
figures show the high and low sale prices of particular
makes of machines in certain areas of the country, and by
taking an average of these figures the true representative
value of the machines was found, which the court stated
was the fair and reasonable value of the machines. As the
transcript indicated, the credit was actually more than the
machines resold for. As stated supra, the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of the final resale of the machines, but this evidence was excluded upon objection of
the defendant. There is no doubt that this finding is in
accordance ~th the evidence.
POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING
AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NUMBER TEN,
THAT ENY DEFECf THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN
IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, SAID FINDING
BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE AND
DEFENDANT NOT HAVING ALLEGED ANY CLAIM
FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY.
The defendant testified that he knew o the terms of
the contract; that he was aware of Paragraph 4 of the contract (Ex. A) which stated:
"No warranties, representations or agreements
have been made by Seller unless specifically set forth
herein, and this contract may not be enlarged, modified, or altered except by endorsement hereon signed
by the parties hereto."
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The plaintiff did not make any warranties .either oral or
in writing. In fact, the plaintiff made no warranties at all.
The defendant testified that he knew of the warranty made
by the manufacturer as to the workmanship and the working parts of the machine. The evidence indicates that he
felt the machines were satisfactory enough to put on location, and he felt that they were serviceable because he
made no complaint to the plaintiff that the machines were
defective until Mr. Knudsen called him by phone and
asked him to make a payment on the contract or the machines would be repossessed. Even at this time, Mr. Knudsen testified, the only defect the defendant mentioned was
that the machines needed oiling when he received them.
We would submit that the authority cited by the appellant is correct, Jones on Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Vol. 3, Sec. 1331; however, he does not emphasize that particular part of his citation which is quoted as
follows:
"One of the essentials of a rescission is that the
vendee must return, or offer to return the goods to
the vendor or show why such return can not be made.
Moreover, the right of rescission must be exercised
promptly upon discovery by the vendee of the facts
which give rise to it, as where the vendor is claimed to
have made false representations concerning the property."
The evidence would indicate that the defendant's contention that the machines were defective was an afterthought, arrived at as a defense to payment after threat
of repossession was made by the plaintiff.
There was no evidence of rescission introduced by the
defendant. If the defendant had intended to rescind, ,he is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
required to act promptly.
authority on this point:

The following is submitted as

"One having the right to rescind a contract must
assert it without delay." Wall vs. Zynda, 283 Mich.
260, 278 N. W. 66.
"A right to rescind, abrogate or cancel a contract
must be exercised promptly on discovery of the facts
from which it arises; and may be waived by continuing to treat the contract as a subsisting obligation."
Nelson vs. Chicago Mill and Lumber Corporation, 100
A.L.R. 87, 76 F. 2d 17.
"A party to a contract cannot avail himself of the
benefits of it and at the same time deny the responsibilities imposed by it." Nelson vs. Chicago Mill and
Lumber Corporation, 100 A.L.R 87, 76 F. 2d 17.

In this case the defendant knew about the alleged defect upon opening the crates. If these defects were so material as to justify a rescission, he should have acted then,
but he states that he felt the machines were good enough
to put on location, and he did put them on location and
kept them there for over five weeks. No notice of rescission was tendered to the plaintiff, and not until the plaintiff had called the defendant on the phone to demand payment on the contract did the defendant mention any defect
in the machines, but even at this time he did not indicate
a rescission, as the facts show. The Utah Supreme Court
has put it as follows:
"While the buyer need not rescind the sale immediately upon discovering the grounds therefore, he
must rescind within a reasonable time after discovering the facts justifying rescission; what is a reasonable time depending on the circumstances. * * *
Whether the right to rescind was exercised with a
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reasonable time is usually regarded as a question of
fact for the jury." Smith vs. Columbus Buggy Co. et
al., 123 P. 580, 40 Utah 580.
Here, if the defendant had a right to rescind, he certainly did not exercise it promptly and he offered no explanation for his use of the equipment for the period of
five weeks after knowledge of the defects, if any, was had
upon opening the ·crates. In fact, there was no rescission.
There was no meeting of the minds, no agreement
that the sale would be rescinded or anything of that nature
decided upon by the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff
ahd performed everything that he was required tb perform
under the contract.
The defendant had never made a payment upon the
-contract. The machines had been in service and on location for over five weeks before the defendant even conversed with the plaintiff in regard to the machines, and
this convers~tion was at the plaintiff's bequest and at his
expense, d~ng a telephone call made by the plaintiff to
the defenda.nt asking for payment on the contract. If the
appellant relies upon an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, he did not state so in his answer, and
consequently, did not raise any issue nor put the plaintiff
to any proof in this respect. American Jurisprudence
states:
"In civil cases it is a well-·recognized rule that
questions not advanced on the original hearing will not
be considered on the petition for a rehearing." 3 A. J.
350, Sec. 806.
But supposing that there is. some evidence of the machines being defective, nevertheless, there certainly was
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evidence introduced that the machines were useable and
serviceable. The amount of the defect is disputable; however, the trial court found that they were minor. The Utah
court has ruled in Jorgensen v. Gessell Pressed Brick Company, 43 Utah 31, 141 p. 460, and as stated in the syllabus
said:
. "Findings based on conflicting evidence will not
be disturbed on appeal."

In Angerman Co., Inc. v. Edgemont, et. ux., 76 Utah
394, 290 p. 169, the court stated on p. 403 as follows:
"The Supreme Court could not interfere with finding of negligence, where evidence was such that reasonable minds might draw opposite inferences from it."
Based upon the above argument the respondent will
submit that there was no evidence of a rescission and that
the finding of the trial court as to the condition of the machines cannot be disturbed because of the nature of the
evidence before it.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING
A JUDGlVIENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF, SAID
JUDGMENT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LAW AND EVIDENCE.
The defendant fails to take into consideration that although in the conclusion of law, the court states that the
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the sum of $1,860.96,
the balance due on the contract, that it also said that the
defendant is entitled to a credit of $1 ,185.00, and that these
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two provisions must be read together to determine what
the court meant as a final judgment. The net judgment
rendered shows that it is not for the full contract price, but
merely for the amount due the seller after the buyer had
been given credit for the value of the merchandise repossessed.
CONCLUSION
The appellant states that the trial court's findings were
contrary to the evidence in every one of his Points for Argument. Assuming, without admitting, that there may be
some merit in the appellant's contention, the ultimate question before the appellate court is whether the trial court
has arrived at a correct conclusion. It is interested only
incidentally, if at all, in the process of reasoning by which
such conclusion was reached. The Utah Court has said in
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, et
al., 48 .Utah 342, 159 P. 737:
"We need not concern ourselves with all that the
court may have said. Its reasons for dismissing the
action against the company are not controlling. The
controlling question is whether the dismissal can be
sustained in law."
In Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, this
same court has said:
"Though the ·c·ourt erred in granting the motion
on the particular ground on which it was granted, still
if it ought to have been granted on one or more of the
other grounds of motion; the ruling will nevertheless
be upheld.,
The respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court is correct and that the judgment should be sustained,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
and that if there is any error committed by the trial court, .

it is an error of which the appellant cannot take advantage, ·
it being an error of his own making.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD,
Attorney for Respondent
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